SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases of
interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal
community in keeping abreastof some of the more interestingchanges in
significant areas of Third Circuitpractice.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-NEw

JERSEY RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-

A RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ARISES WHEN A CHARACTER BECOMES SO
ASSOCIATED WITH A PERFORMER AS TO BE INDISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THE PERFORMER IN PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND A CAUSE OF

ACTION FOR RIGHT OF PUBLICITY INFRINGEMENT ACCRUING DURING A PERFORMER'S LIFETIME SURVWVES THE DEATH OF THE PER-

FORMER-McFarlandv..Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
In McFarland v. Miller, George "Spanky" McFarland of "Our
Gang" and "Little Rascals" fame brought suit challenging the unauthorized use of the name "Spanky McFarland's" by a restaurant in
Ocean Township, NewJersey. 14 F.3d at 916. In addition to using
the name "Spanky McFarland's," the restaurant displayed murals
and photographs of the "Our Gang" characters, including McFarland's "Spanky" character. The restaurant also included several
items on the menu that referred to the "Our Gang" characters,
such as "Spanky's Steak Sandwich" and "Alfalfa's Sprout Burger."
Id. at 916 n.8. Defendant-appellee Joseph Miller stated in a deposition that he chose the name "Spanky McFarland's" for the restaurant simply because the name "McFarland" sounded Irish and his
son was once nicknamed "Spanky." Id. at 916.
George McFarland was dubbed "Spanky" by a newspaper reporter before his first "Our Gang" appearance in 1931. Id. at 915.
The "Our Gang" producer learned of the nickname and used
"Spanky" as the name of McFarland's character in the ninety-plus
"Our Gang" and "Little Rascals" films in which McFarland appeared. A series of short films, "Our Gang," subsequently known as
the "Little Rascals," pitted mischievous children of limited financial
means against pretentious rich kids and rule-governed adults in
lighthearted comic situations. Id. at 914 n.3. The series gained
wide acclaim, including a 1936 Academy Award for the best short
subject film. In addition to his appearances as "Spanky" in the
"Our Gang" series, McFarland appeared as "Spanky" for product
endorsements, autograph shows, celebrity events, and college performances. Id. at 915 n.6. As recently as 1993, McFarland appeared as "Spanky" on the television comedy, Cheers. McFarland
did not play "Spanky" in several of the full-length films in which he
appeared, but was usually listed in the credits as "Spanky McFarland." Id. at 915 n.4.
McFarland filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey claiming infringement of his right of publicity and seeking injunctive relief and damages based on the restau1713
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rant's unauthorized use of the name "Spanky McFarland's." Id. at
916. The district court granted Miller's motion for summary judgment and dismissed McFarland's claims for injunctive relief and
damages. Id. The trial court concurrently denied McFarland's
cross-motion for summary judgment as to the defendant-appellee's
liability. Id. The trial judge reasoned that McFarland's 1936 employment contract with Hal Roach Studios extinguished any right
McFarland had to commercially exploit the name "Spanky McFarland." Id. McFarland subsequently moved for reconsideration and
submitted exhibits to illustrate that the district court's interpretation of the contract was inconsistent with the mutual understanding of the parties to the contract. Id. The trial court denied
McFarland's motion for reconsideration and refused to review the
proffered exhibits because they were not submitted in accordance
with a local rule of court. Id.
George McFarland filed an appeal with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit challenging the district
court's decision. Id. The court of appeals reversed the district
court and remanded the case, holding that it was error to construe
McFarland's 1936 employment contract as depriving McFarland of
the right to commercially exploit the name and image of the
"Spanky" character that had arguably become so associated with
McFarland as to be indistinguishable from McFarland in public
perception. Id. at 918. The court of appeals further held that a
cause of action for right of publicity infringement that accrues during a performer's lifetime survives the death of the performer. Id.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Hutchinson quickly disposed of the relevant standard of review and choice of law principles and delved into the substantive issues of the case. Id. at 917.
Judge Hutchinson next lamented the death of George McFarland
during the pendency of the appeal and noted the substitution of
McFarland's wife, Doris, as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a). Id. at 917, 914 n.1. The judge asserted
that McFarland's passing necessitated a preliminary inquiry into
whether, under New Jersey law, an action for right of publicity infringement survives the death of the public figure. Id. at 917. The
court acknowledged that a prior case had established the
descendibility of the right of publicity under New Jersey law, but
discerned that this case presented a different issue because the infringement in this case occurred during the public figure's lifetime. Id. (citing Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355

(D.NJ. 1981)).
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Upon scrutinizing NewJersey's survival of civil actions statute,
the panel related that the statute provides for the survival of causes
of action sounding in trespass against property, real or personal.
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1987)). Judge Hutchinson concluded that a cause of action for right of publicity infringement survives under the statute because, in New Jersey, the
right of publicity is considered property. Id. at 917-18 (citations
omitted). The judge buttressed this conclusion by observing that
the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a defamation claim
accruing during the lifetime of the defamed person survives the
death of the person under the survival of civil actions statute. Id. at
918 (citing Canino v. New York Times, Inc., 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528
(1984)). Judge Hutchinson reasoned that if a claim for defamation, which is regarded as a harm personal to the individual under
New Jersey law, survives the death of the person defamed, then a
claim for right of publicity infringement must survive because it is a
proprietary harm rather than a personal harm. Id.
Finding that McFarland's cause of action survived his passing,
the court proceeded to address the merits of McFarland's claim.
Id. The Third Circuit prefaced its discussion by voicing its disagreement with the district court's implication that a performer cannot obtain a right of publicity in a character if the performer is
merely playing a role. Id. The court first defined the right of publicity as "the right of an individual, especially a public figure or a
celebrity, to control the commercial value and exploitation of his
name and picture or likeness and prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for commercial benefit." Id. (quoting Estate
of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1353). The panel then remarked that
previous federal decisions had recognized the right of publicity
and explained that the NewJersey courts had given right of publicity protection to public figures to prevent unfair encroachment
upon the fruits of their fame. Id. at 919. The court next reviewed
opinions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits which had recognized
that right of publicity protection extends beyond a public figure's
exact name or likeness and safeguards a public figure's identity.
Id. at 919-20.
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the judge re-

counted, the Ninth Circuit found that Vanna White had a viable
claim for right of publicity infringement against a defendant that
used a well-dressed robot farcically resembling White and positioned in front of a Wheel ofFortune-like board of letters in its advertisements without White's authorization. Id. at 919 (citing White v.
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Samsung ElectronicsAmerica, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993)). The panel also discussed Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets in which the Sixth Circuit found that
Johnny Carson's right of publicity was infringed by the unauthorized use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" in conjunction with defendant's marketing efforts because Carson's identity was intentionally
exploited by another for commercial purposes. Id. at 920 (citing
Carson v. Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Judge Hutchinson further emphasized that in Carson, the Sixth Circuit did not confine the scope of protection to Carson's actual
name and likeness but extended protection to all things so associated with Carson as to invoke his identity. Id.
Using the two circuit decisions to establish that the right of
publicity protects a public figure's identity and prevents any unauthorized means of invoking that identity, the Third Circuit moved
on to analyze whether the "Spanky" character had become so associated with McFarland as to become part of his identity and
whether this identification vested a right of publicity in McFarland
under New Jersey law. Id. The panel first conceded that merely
appearing as a well-defined character that is not linked with the
performer might not create a right of publicity in the performer.
Id. (citations omitted). The court recounted, however, that prior
cases contained language espousing the position that a performer
has rights in an original character created by the performer and
played exclusively by the performer. Id. (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring)).
Refining this concept, Judge Hutchinson articulated that the
originality of the character, while relevant, should not be dispositive of the right of publicity analysis. Id. The judge discerned that
the relevant determination is whether the character has become so
associated with the performer as to be indistinguishable from the
performer's own public image. Id. The court averred that the
existence of such an association vests in the performer a right of
publicity enabling the performer to commercially exploit this association and prevent others from doing so. Id. The panel supported its reasoning by demonstrating that this principle had been
used in prior cases protecting Woody Allen's character in Annie
Hall and Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy's on-screen images. Id. at
921 (citations omitted). The Third Circuit concluded that a performer who is so identified with an on-screen image as to be indistinguishable from that image in public perception has a right of
publicity in that image and has a superior right to commercially
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exploit that image than third parties who had nothing to do with
the creation of the image. Id. Without deciding whether McFarland was so identified with the "Spanky" character as to have a right
of publicity in the character, the Third Circuit determined that
there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact on
this issue and make summary judgment inappropriate. Id.
The panel found this result consistent with NewJersey case law
which since 1909 had recognized the proprietary nature of a person's identity. Id. The court posited that New Jersey cases have
taken the position that public figures have a right to benefit from
their fame and exclude others from commercially exploiting their
identity. Id. at 921-22. Judge Hutchinson argued that if McFarland
could prove his identification with the "Spanky" character, then
the name "Spanky McFarland" would be protected under New
Jersey's right of publicity and Miller would be precluded from commercially exploiting the name absent authorization. Id. at 922.
The judge dismissed Miller's contract defense holding that the record did not support the district court's conclusion that the 1936
employment contract vitiated McFarland's rights to the name and
image of "Spanky"; in this regard, Judge Hutchinson pointed out
that the contract was temporally limited to its fixed term plus one
year. Id. at 922-23.
In McFarland v. Miller, the Third Circuit elucidated the
breadth of protection afforded by New Jersey's right of publicity.
Initially, the court validated the status of the right of publicity as
property by according it the same treatment as other forms of
property under New Jersey's survival of civil causes of action statute. By concluding that a cause of action for right of publicity infringement accruing during the public figure's lifetime survives the
death of the public figure, the court sends a clear message that the
right to seek redress for the misappropriation of a public figure's
identity does not expire with the public figure.
The opinion also establishes that the New Jersey right of publicity affords protection to all words and images that invoke a performer's identity in the public perception and not just the
performer's actual name or likeness. The value of using words and
images to invoke a public figure's identity is made manifest by the
attempts of third parties to do so in order to capitalize on the public figure's association with a product. Realizing that a performer
who creates an identity has a proprietary interest in all means of
invoking the identity, the courtjoined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
and extended right of publicity protection beyond the public fig-
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ure's actual name and likeness. This extended right of publicity
will more fully protect the property interest that public figures,
such as George McFarland, have in their identity by preserving all
means of invoking that identity to the celebrity alone and preventing others from invoking that identity for commercial purposes
without the public figure's authorization.
Peterj Armenio

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A MAGISTRATE'S
FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE WILL BE UPHELD IF THE AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT CONTAINS

SUFFICIENT

FACTS TO INDICATE THAT EVIDENCE WILL BE DISCOVERED IN A

PARTICULAR PLACE-UnitedStates v. Conley, 4

F.3d 1200 (3d Cir.

1993).
In the course of an ongoing investigation involving video
poker machines and illegal gambling operations in the City of Pittsburgh, Detective John Bosetti applied for a search warrant for a
commercial building occupied by the defendant's business. 4 F.3d
at 1203. In support of the application, Detective Bosetti submitted
an affidavit of probable cause that detailed the reasons why a
search warrant should issue. Id. at 1203-04. The affidavit set forth
the following information: (1) detectives examined video poker
machine permits and ascertained that Duffy's Vending Company,
whose address was 930 Sawmill Run Boulevard, was the owner of
certain machines located in various places throughout the City of
Pittsburgh; (2) after playing these video poker machines and accumulating the required amount of credits, detectives received illegal cash payments; (3) John "Duffy" Conley, who had previously
been convicted of gambling violations in connection with operating video poker machines, was the owner of Duffy's Vending Company; and (4) detectives observed a truck registered to Duffy's
Vending Company transporting covered video devices.
Upon reviewing the application and affidavit, a magistrate
found probable cause to search Duffy's Vending Company's place
of business located at 930 Sawmill Run Boulevard. Id. at 1204. A
search warrant was issued authorizing the police to seize any gambling paraphernalia, video poker machines, records and other
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items characteristic of illegal gambling operations. Id. During the
search, the police seized documentary evidence that was subsequendy used to indict John "Duffy" Conley and others on illegal
gambling charges. Id. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search, and the district court
granted the motion on the grounds that the warrant's supporting
affidavit did not state facts sufficient to establish probable cause for
the search. Id. Reversing, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit critiqued the district court's use of an unduly
restrictive standard in its probable cause evaluation, and set forth
that a supporting affidavit need only indicate a reasonable
probability that evidence will be located. Id. at 1203, 1205.
Writing for the unanimous court, Judge Cowen first considered the appropriate standard of review applicable to a reviewing
court's evaluation of a magistrate's probable cause determination.
Id. at 1204. The court explained that while it had plenary review
over the district court's decision, both the district court and the
court of appeals were required to afford great deference to the
magistrate's initial finding of probable cause. Id. at 1204-05 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))). Recognizing that
although a reviewing court might not agree that probable cause
exists under a certain set of circumstances, Judge Cowen emphasized that the reviewing court must not conduct its own probable
cause determination, but must confine itself to a determination of
whether there is a substantial basis for the magistrate's decision.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir.
1993)).
With the appropriate standard of review determined, the
court scrutinized Detective Bosetti's affidavit in its entirety and
found that it supported the magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at 1205-07. Judge Cowen noted that the affidavit of probable cause included, but was not limited to, information regarding
illegal cash payments from certain video poker machines, the
name and address of the owner of the machines, and evidence of
prior illegal activity of the principal owner of the company furnishing the machines. Id. at 1206. According to the court, these facts
supported the magistrate's finding of probable cause because there
existed a fair probability that the police would uncover evidence of
criminal activity at the company's business address. Id.
The defendants argued that under Pennsylvania law their
video poker machines were not illegal per se because they did not
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have "knock-down" buttons that automatically paid out cash to a
winner. Id. The court dismissed this argument because the machines were being used for illicit purposes, notwithstanding the absence of a knock-down button. Id. Pointing to the affidavit's
statement that detectives were paid cash for accumulating a certain
number of credits on the machines, the court maintained that because Pennsylvania law made it illegal to sell or lease any device or
machine for illegal gambling purposes, there existed sufficient
probable cause to believe that the machines' lessor or owner was
connected to the gambling activities, and that evidence of gambling would be present at his business premises. Id. The court further justified the search on the grounds that even assuming the
lessor or owner was not linked to gambling, there was still probable
cause to believe that documents kept at 930 Sawmill Run
Boulevard would reveal whether any lessees or buyers of the machines were using them illegally. Id. at 1206-07.
Judge Cowen acknowledged that there was no direct evidence
that police would discover proof of illegality on the defendant's
business premises. Id. at 1207. The judge noted, however, that
such proof is not required. Id. (citing Jones, 994 F.2d at 1056). It is
sufficient, the court elaborated, for the magistrate to read the affidavit and draw inferences from the facts presented therein. Id.
(quoting Jones, 994 F.2d at 1056 (quoting United States v. Jackson,
756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1985))). Proclaiming that such inferences can reasonably link the premises to be searched to the illegal
activity in light of the totality of the circumstances, the court articulated that a magistrate could reasonably conclude that there was a
connection between the illegal pay-offs and Duffy's Vending Company's business premises because the video machines associated
with the pay-offs were owned by the company whose address was
listed on the machines' permits as 930 Sawmill Run Boulevard. Id.
The court next identified another factor supporting a finding
of probable cause: John "Duffy" Conley had a previous criminal
record for violating Pennsylvania's gambling laws. Id. Judge
Cowen asserted that it was both permissible and helpful to use
prior arrests and convictions in an affidavit of probable cause. Id.
(citations omitted). The judge stressed that such use of a defendant's prior criminal record is especially useful when the defendant
has been convicted of the same general crime, as was the case with
John "Duffy" Conley. Id.
The court next considered defendants' contention that there
was no probable cause because the affidavit's last paragraph stated
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that the detectives wanted to achieve a better understanding of the
gambling operation's internal machinations. Id. at 1207-08. Dismissing this argument, the court simply observed that affidavits
should not be judged by the quality of their prose nor should individual statements be judged in isolation from the remainder of the
affidavit. Id. (citations omitted). A poor choice of words or poor
draftsmanship, the court stated, is insufficient reason to overturn
an otherwise valid search warrant. Id. at 1208.
Turning-to the district court's reasoning, Judge Cowen opined
that the district court unduly concentrated on facts omitted from
the affidavit to reach its conclusion that no probable cause existed.
Id. In doing so, the judge averred that the district court applied an
unduly restrictive standard, essentially conducting a de novo review
of the magistrate's findings. Id. at 1203, 1208. Judge Cowen posited that the district court should have simply inquired whether the
affidavit contained sufficient facts to support a finding of probable
cause. Id. at 1208.
Finally, the court addressed defendants' argument that the
search warrant did not particularly describe the items to be seized
and therefore was impermissibly overbroad in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. Despite authorizing the seizure of "all
revenue records," the court held that the use of the word "all" did
not make the warrant overbroad. Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, because the warrant, when taken as a whole, was limited to
items indicative of illegal activity, the court found that such a limitation was sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's specificity
requirement. Id. For these reasons, the court of appeals held that
a reviewing court may only ask whether the facts contained in an
affidavit in support of a search warrant provide a substantial basis
for a reasonable probability that evidence will be uncovered. Id. at
1205, 1208. Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrant. Id. at 1208-09.
Probable cause is sometimes in the eye of the beholder, and a
case can certainly be made in support of or against Detective
Bosetti's affidavit of probable cause. But while the respective decisions of the magistrate and the court of appeals are firmly supported by the facts contained in the affidavit, the district court
chose to focus on what was omitted. As pointed out by the court of
appeals, this approach is wrong as a matter of law. A magistrate
should consider only what is present in the affidavit, not what is
missing. Should the facts as presented by the applicant not rise
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above the probable cause threshold, then of course the search warrant should not issue. To judge the application by any other standard is surely deficient.
Law enforcement officials should not spend valuable time in
meticulously crafting an affidavit to meet a reviewing court's
heightened scrutiny. Instead, police need only present the facts
simply and honestly. A magistrate should and indeed must draw
inferences from the facts. The district court must have blinked in
order not to see the link between the illegal gambling activity and
Duffy's Vending Company. If Duffy's Vending Company itself was
not involved in any illegality, then surely there was more than a fair
probability that it was selling or leasing machines to those involved
in illegal gambling. This fact alone justifies a search of Duffy's
Vending Company's business premises to gather evidence implicating those other suspected criminals.
Society may never totally prevail in the incessant war on crime.
The judiciary, however, should keep both eyes open to ensure that
as many battles as possible are won.
PaulJ Bento
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Immigration & NaturalizationService, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
LIKELY To BE SINGLED OUT FOR PERSECUTION-Fatin v.

In Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Sev., Parastoo Fatin,
an eighteen-year old native and citizen of Iran, entered the United
States under a student visa on December 31, 1978, about two weeks
before the exile of the Shah. 12 F.3d at 1235. Fatin graduated
from high school in the United States in May 1979, and subsequently entered college that September. While still a college student, Fatin applied to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) for political asylum, as provided by Section 208(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
At later procedural stages, Fatin amended her application for relief
by adding a request for withholding of deportation under INA
§ 243(h) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988), and by additionally or
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alternatively applying for suspension of deportation under INA
§ 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988). Id. at 1236. In her
original application for asylum, Fatin alleged that if returned to
Iran, she would be persecuted by the Iranian government because
she belonged to a group which supported the Shah, and because
wealthy educated families were viewed suspiciously. Id. at 1235.
She further supported her application with representations that
family members in Iran had been harassed and jailed in the past.
Relying on an advisory opinion from the State Department,
the INS denied Fatin's asylum application in January 1986 on the
grounds that she had failed to establish the required "well-founded
fear" of persecution. Id. By that time, Fatin was no longer in college. Id. at 1236. Consequently, in February 1986, the INS initiated deportation proceedings against Fatin because she was no
longer a student and was thus in violation of the conditions of her
nonimmigrant student visa. Id. at 1235-36. At a deportation hearing in May 1986, Fatin renewed her asylum application and applied
for further relief in the form of withholding of deportation. Id. at
1236. Fatin added a request for suspension of deportation at a May
1987 hearing before an immigration judge. Id.
Testifying in support of her various applications for relief from
deportation, Fatin recounted her political activities and associations before coming to America, one of which was a women's rights
group connected to the sister of the Shah of Iran. Id. Fatin asserted that her fear of returning to Iran was driven by the Iranian
government's enforcement of rules and regulations regarding the
activities and practices of women in Iranian society. Id. Fatin, an
avowed feminist, testified that she would be forced to wear a veil
under threat of public punishment, which could include whipping
and stoning. Id.
Although finding that Fatin would be discriminated against in
Iran based on her sex, the Immigration Judge denied each of her
petitions for relief because she failed to prove that she would be
singled out for persecution. Id. Citing Fatin's lack of political activism while in the United States and the absence of any open opposition to the Khomeni Government, the judge ruled that she had
not sustained the burden of proof for withholding of deportation
(likelihood of persecution), asylum (well-founded fear of persecution), or suspension of deportation (extreme hardship). Id. at
1236-37.
Fatin appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that she qualified for asy-
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lum based on her fear of persecution because of her membership
in a particular social group, one of the grounds for asylum enumerated in INA § 208(a). Id. at 1237 (citation omitted). Fatin defined
that group as "the social group of the upper class of Iranian women
who supported the Shah of Iran, a group of educated Westernized
free-thinking individuals." Id. (citation omitted). Fatin further
proclaimed her "deep-rooted beliefs in freedom of choice, freedom of expression [and] equality of opportunity for both sexes."
Id. (citation omitted).
The Board dismissed Fatin's appeal and ordered her to depart
the United States on the grounds that she had not shown that she
would be treated any differently in Iran than would the rest of the
population. Id. Denying Fatin's petition for review, the Third Circuit held that she was not eligible for withholding of deportation
because she could not establish that she would be persecuted, or
that she had a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 1240-42.
Judge Alito, writing for a unanimous panel, first addressed Fatin's claims that she was entitled to withholding of deportation,
and that she should be granted asylum based on her association
with a particular social group as well as her political opinion. Id. at
1238. The court distinguished between these similar forms of relief from deportation. Id. An alien seeking withholding of deportation, explained the court, is not to be deported if the "Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
Id. (citing INA § 243(h) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1) (1988)) (emphasis added). "Would be" has been interpreted, the court continued,
to require the alien to establish a "clear probability of persecution."
Id. (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)). The court emphasized that once this standard has been met, the Attorney General must grant the alien the requested relief. Id. (citing Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2553 (1993)).
The section of the INA regarding asylum, Judge Alito contrasted, provides for discretionary relief, although adopting essentially the same definition of persecution. Id. The court added that
an alien seeking asylum need not show a clear probability to be
eligible for relief, but merely a "well-founded fear" of persecution.
Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987)).
Concerning Fatin's specific claims, the court lamented the
lack of consensus among the courts and commentators, as well as
the lack of any clear indication of legislative intent as to the defini-
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tion of the term "particular social group." Id. at 1238-39. Despite
the lack of guidance, Judge Alito took solace in the minimal level
of review appropriate in this case, noting that the BIA's interpretation of the Refugee Act was entitled to great deference from the
circuit court. Id. The Board's decision would therefore stand, explained the judge, unless the court found that the decision had not
been based on a legitimate construction of the statute. Id. Finding
the BIA's interpretation to be a permissible statutory construction
based upon the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the court thus accepted
the Board's definition of "particular social group" as "a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic."
Id. (citation omitted). The court further stated that whether a
group characteristic constitutes a "particular social group" will be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1240.
Having defined the relevant terms, the court proceeded to formulate a three-part test to be met by aliens seeking relief from deportation based on facing persecution as a member of a particular
social group. Id. Under the court's test, Fatin would be required
to: (1) identify a group which meets the definition of a particular
social group; (2) establish her membership in that group; and (3)
prove that based on her membership she would be persecuted or
have a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. Applying this standard, the court quickly dismissed Fatin's claim that she qualified
for withholding of deportation because she did not meet the third
prong of the test-that she would be persecuted solely because of
her sex. Id. The court reasoned that although Americans might
find the overall treatment of women in Iran repugnant, such treatment could be accurately described as "generally harsh conditions
shared by many other persons," but not rising to the level of persecution. Id. Setting forth specifically that persecution does not include all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust,
unlawful, or unconstitutional, Judge Alito concluded that Fatin
had not established a well-founded fear of persecution based
merely upon the fact that she is a woman. Id. at 1240-41 (citation
omitted).
The court next considered the more difficult issue of whether
Fatin could establish eligibility for relief from deportation based
upon the probability, or her fear, of persecution based on her
membership in the more visible subgroup of "Iranian women who
refuse to conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social norms." Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). Judge Alito commented that the subgroup as defined by Fatin probably would meet
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the first prong of the test. Id. Fatin's problem, the judge averred,
was that she had not established her membership of that group.
Id. The court took issue with Fatin's alleged membership in the
group because in her testimony she declined to state unequivocally
that she would refuse to comply with the Iranian laws, especially
those regarding the wearing of veils in public. Id. at 1241-42. Instead, the court posited, Fatin's testimony established her as a
member of a somewhat larger group of Iranian women who did
not like Iran's gender-specific laws and preferred not to comply with
them. Id. at 1242.
As a member of this larger group, the court continued, Fatin
could not meet the required standard for persecution because she
could not satisfy the third prong of the test-that she would be
subjected to persecution as a consequence of membership in that
particular group. Id. In so ruling, the court rejected Fatin's contention that compliance with the gender-specific laws against her
preference would constitute persecution as defined in the INA. Id.
Judge Alito noted, however, that the result may be different in a
situation where the forced compliance is physically painful or is
"abhorrent to that individual's deepest beliefs." Id. Maintaining
that Fatin had failed to meet this standard, the judge cited laws
requiring a renunciation of a person's religious beliefs or desecration of an item of religious significance as exemplary of situations
where forced compliance could amount to persecution, at least
where that person actually held those beliefs or attached significance to the religious item. Id.
With regard to Fatin's claim that she would be persecuted
based on her political beliefs, the court applied a similar threepronged test. Id. Specifically, the panel proclaimed that for Fatin
to be granted refugee status based on her political opinion she
must: (1) identify the political opinion on which she bases her petition; (2) demonstrate that she does hold that opinion; and (3)
show either the potential for actual, or a well-founded fear, of persecution because of her opinion. Id. Conceding that Fatin's claim
of being a feminist would satisfy the first two prongs, Judge Alito
nonetheless denied the political opinion portion of her petition
because she had failed to satisfactorily establish that she would be
subjected to treatment meeting the INA's definition of persecution
as a result of her feminist opinions. Id. at 1242-43.
Finally, the judge addressed Fatin's claim that she had been
improperly denied suspension of deportation under INA § 244(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1988). Id. at 1243. Suspension of deporta-
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tion, the court explained, is a discretionary relief from deportation
that can be granted when the Attorney General believes that an
alien meeting certain other requirements would be subjected to
"extreme hardship" if returned to his or her country of nationality.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C § 1254(a) (1) (1988)). Because suspension of
deportation is a discretionary relief, the petitioner had pinned her
hopes on an argument that the BIA had erred procedurally in failing to assess separately the facts and circumstances of her case in
light of her request for suspension of deportation, as distinguished
from her claims for asylum and/or withholding of deportation. Id.
Judge Alito rejected this argument, noting Fatin's request for suspension was based on essentially the same facts and circumstances
as her other claims for relief. Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed
Fatin's petition for review, holding that she had not established the
requisite likelihood of persecution if deported, and that oppressive
conditions common to a large segment of the population in an
alien's native country are not sufficient to qualify for relief. Id. at
1240-42, 1244.
Although the approach represented by the Third Circuit's decision in Fatin could lead to the unfortunate deportation of innocent, law-abiding, and potentially productive aliens, it represents a
thoughtful, pragmatic approach to claims of refugee, asylee, or related status. A standard for relief such as that suggested by petitioner would prove unworkable, as it would vest large portions of
the populations of many nations with cognizable claims to refugee
or asylee status. Despite the obvious humanitarian and philanthropic interests that would be served by providing relief to the
masses who are subjected to treatment that most Americans consider offensive, or even cruel and inhumane, the limited resources
of our nation clearly could not sustain such a broadened basis for
permitting residence in the United States.
Steven E. Coleman
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JURISDICTION-INJUNCTIONS-INTERLOCUTORY

TRICT COURT ORDER
JUNCTION WITHIN

Is NOT

Dis-

IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE AS AN

28 U.S.C. § 1292(A) (1) WHERE

IN-

THE ORDER

DIRECTS THE NON-PARTY COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADE-

MARKS

To

CANCEL A TRADEMARK REGISTRATION-Santana Prod-

ucts, Inc. v. CompressionPolymers, Inc., 8 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 1993).
Santana Products, Inc., appellee, has manufactured and marketed restroom partitions under the name "Santana," allegedly
since 1979. 8 F.3d at 153. Although Santana Products registered
its trademark with the Department of State of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, it never registered its mark with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. Compression Polymers, Inc., appellant, also has manufactured and marketed restroom partitions, but
has done so under the name "Sanatec." Compression Polymers has
used the "Sanatec" mark allegedly since 1989 and, unlike Santana
Products, registered its mark with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in 1990.
On February 1, 1991, appellee Santana Products commenced
an action against appellant Compression Polymers alleging unfair
competition, dilution, and infringement of a valid common law
and state registered mark. Id. Santana Products also sought the
cancellation of Compression Polymers's federally registered mark.
Id. After granting Santana Products's motion for summary judgment on the cancellation claim, the district court issued an interlocutory order directing the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks to cancel Compression Polymers's federal trademark
registration. Id.
Following the district court's order of cancellation, Compression Polymers appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. The appellate court asserted that Compression Polymers's
appeal raised a jurisdictional issue not yet addressed in any appellate court's reported opinion. Id. That is, whether an interlocutory district court order is immediately appealable as an injunction,
within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), where the order directs the nonparty Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to cancel a trademark registration. Id. Because the majority determined that the
order did not amount to an injunction, the court held that the
order was not immediately appealable and, therefore, dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
Writing for the majority, Judge Greenberg prefaced his opinion by noting that although the district court order directed the
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Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to cancel Compression
Polymers's federal trademark registration, the court did not expressly indicate that it was issuing an injunction. Id. at 153-54.
Judge Greenberg acknowledged, however, that the district court's
characterization of its own order is not dispositive, because the
court of appeals may still find the order to have injunctive effect.
Id. at 154 (citing Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 96
(3d Cir. 1988)). Judge Greenberg clarified that the pivotal inquiry
for determining whether the order was in fact injunctive under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) concerned the "practical effect" of the district
court order. Id.
The court then set forth a three-part test, first articulated in
Cohen v. Board of Trustees of University of Medicine & Dentistry, to determine whether the practical effect of the court order was injunctive and hence immediately appealable. Id. (citing Cohen v. Board
of Trustees of University of Medicine & Dentistry, 867 F.2d 1455 (3d Cir.
1989) (en banc)). According to the court, for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), an injunctive order must be: (1) directed to a
party; (2) enforceable by contempt; and (3) designed to protect or
accord some substantive relief requested by a complainant. Id. (citation omitted). The court then analyzed the district court order
within the confines of this three-part test and concluded that only
the third requirement for an injunction was satisfied. Id. Therefore, the court determined that the order was not injunctive and
not immediately appealable. Id.
Beginning his analysis with the first prong of the Cohen test,
Judge Greenberg briefly addressed the question of whether the district court order was directed to a party. Id. Quickly disposing of
the issue, the majority indicated that the order was directed to the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks rather than to Compression Polymers. Id. Thus, the court reasoned, the order failed the
first part of the Cohen test because it was not directed to a party to
the action. Id.
Turning to the second prong of the Cohen test, the court next
discussed whether the district court order satisfied what it termed
the "critical inquiry" under Cohen, that is, whether the order was
enforceable pendente lite by contempt. Id. at 154-55. Acknowledging that Compression Polymers may be liable in damages for
continued use of the "Sanatec" trademark, the court nevertheless
contended that Compression Polymers could continue to use the
mark without any risk of being held in contempt. Id. at 154. Judge
Greenberg clarified that Compression Polymers faced no risk of
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contempt because the order neither compelled nor prohibited any
action by them. Id.
Finally, the court distinguished Wrist-Rocket Manufacturing Co.
v. Saunders Archery Co., a trademark infringement action that Compression Polymers relied upon to establish that the court of appeals
had jurisdiction to review the district court's order. Id. at 155 (citing Wrist-Rocket Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 F.2d
846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975)). In Wrist-Rocket, the
court noted, the appellate court claimed to have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) to review a district court order cancelling a
trademark registration and permanently enjoining appellant's use
of the mark. Id. (citation omitted). Judge Greenberg rejected
Compression Polymers's reliance on Wrist-Rocket by explaining that
the district court order at issue in the present case failed to grant a
permanent injunction against Compression Polymers's use of the
trademark. Id. The judge further discerned that Compression
Polymers's right to use its trademark arose from prior use and,
therefore, continued use of the trademark "Sanatec" was permitted, despite the registration cancellation, until Compression
Polymers was permanently enjoined. Id.
Dissenting from the court's opinion, Judge Mansmann expressed disapproval of the majority's conclusions under Cohen's analytical framework and strongly rejected the majority's
determination that the practical effect of the order was not an injunction against appellant's use of its federally registered trademark. Id. at 156-57 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). According to
Judge Mansmann, the district court order satisfied all three prongs
of the Cohen test and had the practical effect of granting an injunction that should be immediately appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Id. at 155-57 (Mansmann,J., dissenting).
Engaging in an independent Cohen analysis, the dissent explained that the first prong of the Cohen test was satisfied because
the order, in practical effect, was directed to a party. Id. at 156
(Mansmann, J., dissenting). Only by elevating form over substance, Judge Mansmann reasoned, could the majority have concluded that the order was directed to the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks with no concomitant effect on Compression
Polymers. Id. In support of this position,Judge Mansmann argued
that the order had the practical effect of granting an injunction to
Santana Products because Compression Polymers would be prohibited from utilizing its federally registered trademark with corresponding federal statutory protection. Id. Moreover, Judge

1994]

SURVEY

1731

Mansmann noted, the district court order of cancellation awarded
direct relief to Santana Products by restraining the actions of their
competitor, Compression Polymers. Id.
The second prong of the Cohen test, the dissent continued, was
fulfilled because the order was enforceable by contempt. Id. judge
Mansmann clarified that although the order was not enforceable
pendente lite by contempt against Compression Polymers, it was
enforceable by contempt against the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks if the Commissioner refused to comply with the directions of the order. Id. Furthermore, the dissent asserted, Compression Polymers should not be required to rely on the
Commissioner's willingness to disobey the order before it is permitted to appeal the cancellation of its federal registration. Id.
Judge Mansmann argued that the third prong of the Cohen test
was satisfied because the order grants the cancellation of appellant's federal registration, the cancellation Santana Products specifically sought in its complaint. Id. at 156-57 (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting). Having thus completed an independent analysis of
the order within the Cohen framework, Judge Mansmann then emphasized that the order had the practical effect of an injunction.
Id. In short, Judge Mansmann opined, the order denied Compression Polymers the protection and benefits of federal trademark registration as surely as if the district court had issued an injunction
against Compression Polymers's use of the trademark. Id. at 156
(Mansmann, J., dissenting).
Finally, Judge Mansmann articulated, by virtue of the district
court order, Santana Products had successfully achieved "through
strategic piecemeal litigation," one of its final aims in the lawsuit.
Id. at 157 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent remarked, instead of seeking an injunction, Santana Products sought
a court order compelling the Commissioner to cancel Compression Polymers's trademark registration. Id. at 157 n.3 (Mansmann,
J., dissenting). If Santana Products asked the district court for an
injunction, the dissent added, the court would have had jurisdiction to review the propriety of the order. Id. (citing Wrist-Rocket
Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975)). Thus, Judge Mansmann concluded, the practical effect of the district court's order was the
granting of an injunction to Santana Products and, as a result, the
order should be immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Id. at 157 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
In holding that the district court order was not injunctive and
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not immediately appealable, the majority unfortunately strays from
the pivotal inquiry: the "practical effect" of the district court order.
Although the majority pays lip service to this critical question, the
majority merely elevates form over substance by contending that
the order is not injunctive. As the dissent poignantly comments, by
refusing to allow immediate review of the order, the court of appeals has essentially permitted Santana Products to achieve one of
its litigation goals during the pendency of the litigation and, at the
same time, to insulate this substantial relief from appellate review.
The court's holding will most likely lead future litigants desiring trademark cancellation to file motions for summary judgment
instead of seeking outright injunctions. Unfortunately, the express
language of the court order, instead of the realistic substantive effect, will govern its immediate appealability. Thus, in this time of
protracted litigation, the form and not the substance of the court
order will enable parties to obtain and enjoy substantive relief for
years before such relief is held invalid on appeal. Such blind adherence to formalities should be shunned rather than embraced by
our courts.
Adrian Daunarummo

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-THE APPLICATION
OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) TO
LAY TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
FIRST AMENDMENT-Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin May

Parish School, 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993).
In Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary ParishSchool, Mary
Geary, a lay teacher for twenty-nine years, was dismissed after
reaching age fifty. 7 F.3d at 326. Geary had received satisfactory
reviews and was the school's highest paid teacher. The Visitation
School claimed Geary was dismissed because she had married a divorced man, and thus violated Church doctrine. Geary maintained
that the school's stated reason for her dismissal was a pretext and
that she had been fired as result of her age and salary level.
Subsequently, Mary Geary brought an action with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the Visitation School and claimed that her termination was in violation of
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). As a result of
this legal action, the Visitation School cancelled Ms. Geary's health
care coverage. The Visitation School explained that they were
compelled to cancel her coverage as a result of the legal action.
The EEOC ruled that the termination had not violated the ADEA.
The EEOC maintained, however, that the retaliatory cancellation
of health care coverage did violate the act.
Following her claim with the EEOC, Geary initiated a civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Id. The district court held that the ADEA does not pertain to religious schools. Id. The district court granted summary judgment
for the Visitation School. Id. Geary appealed the district court's
judgment. Id.
Vacating in part and remanding in part, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did apply to lay teachers in religious
schools. Id. at 325-26. Because Geary failed to raise any opposition to the Visitations School's motion for summary judgment, the
district court's judgement was affirmed as to the termination of
Geary. Id. The court held that the retaliation claim brought
against the Visitation School-based upon the cancellation of
health benefits following the initiation of the legal action-did
raise a question of fact and thus remanded. Id. at 326. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit exercised plenary
review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Visitation School. Id.
The court first noted that the ADEA prohibited both age discrimination as well as any retaliatory action by an employer against
an employee who pursued an action under the Act. Id. The Third
Circuit next set forth three factors that the Supreme Court has applied in determining whether the First Amendment prevents application of the ADEA to religious schools: (1) the statute's
infringement on the First Amendment; (2) analysis of congressional intent; and (3) whether the application of the statute violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 326-27
(citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).
The court noted that in Catholic Bishops, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge by Catholic high schools as to the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) over lay teachers in
religious schools. Id.
Following the explanation of the three-part test established in
Catholic Bishops, the court next applied this test to the facts of the
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case. Id. at 327-28. The court distinguished this case from Catholic
Bishops and concluded that the application of the ADEA did not
result in "a significant risk of entanglement." Id. at 328. Unlike
the extensive jurisdiction of the NLRB, which injected the NLRB
into the schools to evaluate and determine what constituted legitimate conditions of employment, the court asserted that the application of the ADEA was limited. Id. The inquiry of the ADEA, the
court maintained, was whether Geary's dismissal was based on her
age and further, whether the cancellation of health benefits was in
retaliation for her legal action against the Visitation School. Id.
After differentiating the ongoing supervision required by the
NLRB from the limited inquiry and simple prohibition necessitated in the application of the ADEA, the court noted that no conflict existed between the ADEA's prohibition against age
discrimination and the proposed religious doctrine. Id. The court
explained that the Visitation School had not suggested that the
Catholic religion required age discrimination nor had Geary proffered that the ADEA prevented the Visitation School from advancing certain teachings on marriage. Id. Absent any direct conflict,
the court concluded that it need not invoke the interpretive rule
set forth in Catholic Bishops. Id.
The court went on to distinguish another case which similarly
utilized the Catholic Bishops three-part test. Id. at 328-29 (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 (3d Cir. 1991)). The Geary court
noted that the claim in Little--religious discrimination by a lay
teacher against a Catholic school-raised questions pertaining to
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and thus impermissibly required the court to determine what constituted the teachings
of the Catholic Church. Id. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit emphasized that Geary's claims under the
ADEA, unlike those advanced in Little, did not compel any inquiry
into religious doctrines of the Catholic Church and would thus not
result in government entanglement with religion. Id. at 329.
The court stressed that the inquiry as to whether the religious
reason advanced by the Visitation School motivated the termination of Geary was a limited one. Id. The inquiry in an ADEA case,
the court contended, did not involve the determination of the validity of any religious doctrine. Id. Instead, the inquiry only required an assessment of whether or not the religious reason
advanced motivated the termination. Id. at 330. The court cautioned that the plaintiff in an ADEA case could not challenge the
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validity of any proffered religious reason because this would constitute entanglement. Id.
Observing that some courts have refused to permit this limited
inquiry when members of the clergy challenged a termination decision as a pretext, the Third Circuit stated that courts have distinguished cases in which clergy were involved from those involving
employees who do not have religious duties. Id. at 330-31 (citing
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363
(8th Cir. 1991)). Although the court acknowledged that a teacher
in a Catholic school has a duty to uphold the principles of the
Catholic Church, the court held that notwithstanding this general
obligation, it could determine Geary's claims absent any risk of entanglement. Id. at 331.
The court noted that the structure of the ADEA indicated that
Congress intended the statute to have a general application. Id.
The ADEA, the court explained, was modeled after Title VII, which
does not exempt religious institutions from prohibitions of discrimination. Id. Likewise, the court concluded, the ADEA did not
exempt religious institutions from prohibitions of age discrimination. Id.
Although the court agreed that Geary could bring an action
under the ADEA, the court held that Geary failed to present any
evidence in opposition to the Visitation School's motion for summaryjudgment. Id. The court recognized that Geary was required
to refute the school's reason for her dismissal. Id. at 332. Observing Geary's failure to (1) offer a non-religious reason for her dismissal, (2) contest that she was in fact in violation of any religious
teachings, or (3) demonstrate that similarly situated married employees had not been dismissed, the court affirmed the district
court's award of summary judgment as to the age discrimination
claim in favor of the Visitation School. Id. The court remanded
the retaliation claim based upon the cancellation of health benefits
and held that an adequate question of fact had been raised for
trial. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
demonstrated its willingness to afford a previously unprotected
group of employees, lay teachers in religious schools, protection
from age discrimination. The court carefully balanced two competing goals: (1) the prevention of government entanglement with
religion and thus the protection of religious liberties; and (2) the
prohibition of age discrimination in employment. The court's cautious reasoning demonstrated that no entanglement existed under
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these circumstances and therefore the limited inquiry of the ADEA
should be permitted. Wisely, the court noted that circumstances
may exist in which even this limited inquiry might result in governmental entanglement with religion. This could occur namely in
situations where the employee's duties are of a religious nature, as
with clergy members.
This decision, while demonstrating the importance of the
need to deter the entanglement of the government in religion and
prevent secular courts from examining the validity of various religious doctrines, also suggests the growing recognition of the problem of age discrimination in employment. The court's willingness
to apply the ADEA to lay teachers in religious schools indicates
such recognition. Because of the court's legitimate concern with
the prevention of entanglement, however, it may be difficult for
the individual to pursue successfully a claim against a religious
school that uses a religious reason as a pretext. The religious
school need only explain the religious doctrine upon which the
dismissal was based. Should the challenger wish to demonstrate
that she was not in violation of the proffered religious doctrine, as
the court suggests the challenger may attempt to do, the court may
be placed in the uncomfortable position of determining whether
the challenger has complied with the intricacies of a religious doctrine presented to the court by the religious school. Difficulties
may only arise when compliance or noncompliance with a particular doctrine is a matter of degree. In this case, the contested violation was marriage to a divorced man. Clearly, the determination of
whether the individual had indeed married the divorced man is a
simple one. It is possible, however, that more difficult situations
may arise.
In sum, the court's decision that the ADEA does apply to lay
teachers in religious schools is a recognition of the problem of age
discrimination in employment and the need to combat this type of
discrimination. The application of the ADEA to this new arena
also suggests that no institution is immune to the problem of age
discrimination. The need to prohibit age discrimination in religious schools, however, will need to be continually balanced
against the need to prevent government entanglement with religion.
Kimberly A. Flynn
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-FALSE ADVERTISING-CONSUMERS OF
GOODS AND SERVICES Do NOT HAVE A FEDERAL CAUSE OF AcTION FOR FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER SECTION 4 3(A) OF THE
LANHAM AcT--Serbin v. Ziebart Intern., Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d
Cir. 1993).
In 1990, Sara Serbin and George Baker, after purchasing new
automobiles, bought "Super Rust Protection" policies, which protected newly-purchased automobiles from rusting, from defendant
Ziebart Corporation (Ziebart). 11 F.3d at 1165. Serbin and Baker
jointly sued Ziebart in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming that Ziebart made knowingly
false representations in advertisements that the "Super Rust Protection" policy provided substantially more comprehensive rust protection than the coverage included in conventional automobile
manufacturers' warranties. The plaintiffs further alleged that since
1988, standard new automobile warranties had provided rust protection equal to that provided by the Ziebart policy, and that
Ziebart's advertisements described coverage more expansive than
the actual coverage in the written policies. Claiming that Ziebart's
advertisements had misled them into buying "duplicative" protection provided by automobile manufacturers at no extra cost, the
plaintiffs brought a federal claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and a pendent state claim under the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Act.
The district court judge granted Ziebart's motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (3), holding that
the plaintiffs did not state a claim under the Lanham Act. Id. at
1165-66. In so holding, the district court judge stated that the
plaintiffs as consumers did not demonstrate "some reasonable and
cognizable commercial interest" that the Lanham Act was intended
to protect. Id. Because the complaint failed to state a valid federal
cause of action, the district court also dismissed the state claim. Id.
at 1165.
In a second case, Sheilah Guarino sued Sun Company, Inc.,
Sun Refining & Marketing Company, Inc., and Wells, Rich, and
Greene Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that she had been induced to purchase the
defendants' Sunoco Ultra gasoline in reliance on the defendants'
knowingly false advertising claims that "Ultra provided more power
and quicker acceleration" than lower octane gasolines that cost less

1738

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1713

than Ultra. Id. at 1166. Guarino brought her claim under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act and also alleged pendent state law claims.
The district court judge granted the defendants' summary
judgment motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c), agreeing with the Serbin court's assertion that consumers
did not have standing under the Lanham Act. Id. The district
court emphasized that the Lanham Act was designed to protect
commercial interests from unfair competition, and that the Act did
not protect consumer interests. Id.
Serbin and Baker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the Third Circuit consolidated
their case with Guarino's appeal because the two cases presented
the same issue of law. Id. at 1164. The court explained that the
issue in both cases was whether consumers who detrimentally rely
on advertising claims of vendors in purchasing goods or services in
interstate commerce have a federal claim against the vendor under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Pollak of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who was sitting
by designation, pointed out that the Lanham Act's primary purpose was to provide a cause of action for the deceptive and misleading use of trademarks in commerce regulated by Congress. Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The judge also observed that a secondary purpose of the Lanham Act was "to protect persons engaged
in such commerce against unfair competition." Id. (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1127). Judge Pollak agreed with the appellants and the
two district courts that the language of the 1988 amended version
of section 43(a) was broad enough to accommodate consumer
claims for false advertising. Id. In affirming the two district courts'
holdings, however, the court asserted that the case law and legislative history addressing section 43(a) both supported the proposition that the statute was designed to protect competitors with
commercial interests from false advertising, and that consumers
were not included within the scope of the statute. Id. at 1165.
Judge Pollak next examined the legislative history and judicial
interpretation of the Lanham Act. Id. at 1166. The judge pointed
out that when the Lanham Act was first enacted in 1946, it broadened the predecessor statute, section 3 of the Trademark Act of
1920, to include not only a cause of action for false designation of
origin of goods in commerce, but also for false descriptions and
representations of goods in commerce. Id. at 1166-67.
Judge Pollak observed that in 1957, the Third Circuit's first
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interpretation of section 43(a) relied on two noteworthy articles
discussing the Lanham Act. Id. at 1167-68 (citing L'Aiglon Apparel
v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1957)). The court noted
that the first article called for a broad reading of section 43(a) to
give every commercial competitor a cause of action for false advertising. Id. at 1168 (citing Rudolph Callmann, Unfair Competition
and Trade-marks, 48 COLUM. L. REv.876, 886 (1948)). The second
article, Judge Pollak stated, explained that Congress intended to
allow competitors a private cause of action under section 43(a) to
stop unfair competition consisting of misrepresentation of goods
and services in advertisements. Id. (citing Charles Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HAI v. L. REv. 987, 1000 (1949)).
The court then examined the first case that addressed whether
a consumer could validly claim under section 43(a) damages emanating from false advertisements by a vendor of goods or services.
Id. at 1169 (citing Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442
F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)). Judge Pollak
pointed out that the Colligan court had held that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of section 43(a) supported
the claims brought by members of the public or consumers, and
that the Lanham Act was intended to protect solely commercial
interests. Id. at 1169-70 (citing Colligan, 442 F.2d at 691-92). The
Colligan court, Judge Pollak observed, affirmed a district court's dismissal of the claim of two high school students who invoked section
43(a) to sue a company that had made false claims in an advertisement for a ski-weekend package tour because the students did not
represent commercial interests. Id. (citing Colligan, 442 F.2d at
686).
After noting the mixed reaction to the Colligan decision by the
commentators, Judge Pollak reviewed Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit case law after this important case. Id. at 1171-75. The judge
observed that in 1992 the Ninth Circuit addressed an apparent
conflict in Ninth Circuit section 43(a) case law. Id. at 1173 (citing
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)). Judge Pollak
noted that in this 1992 case, the Ninth Circuit clarified that a plaintiff must have a commercial interest to have standing under section
43(a). Id. (citing Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108). Thejudge pointed out
that the Ninth Circuit distinguished the apparently conflicting case
law by distinguishing two types of section 43(a) claims. Id. (citation
omitted).
Quoting the 1992 Ninth Circuit case, Judge Pollak observed
that in the first type of section 43(a) claim, "claims of false repre-
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sentations in advertising," only competitors of the wrongdoer may
bring a cause of action. Id. (quoting Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108-09).
In the second type of claim, the judge pointed out, "a false association claim stemming from the misuse of a mark," the Ninth Circuit
did not require the plaintiff to be a competitor, but at a minimum,
the plaintiff had to have "a commercial interest in the product
wrongfully identified.., or with a commercial interest in the misused mark." Id. (quoting Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108-09).
Turning to Third Circuit case law, Judge Pollak pointed out
that the Third Circuit had sharply criticized Colligan in 1984. Id. at
1174 (citing Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., Inc., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.
1984)). In Thorn, Judge Pollak noted that the Third Circuit held
that the plaintiff, a forty-five percent owner of a trucking company
that went bankrupt, could bring a section 43(a) cause of action
against a competitor van company for false advertising that damaged the plaintiff's business. Id. (citing Thorn, 736 F.2d at 931).
Judge Pollak pointed out that the Thorn court had acknowledged
that although the plaintiff, "as an officer, director and shareholder
of Florida Eastern was not a competitor of Reliance," under the
plain language of the Lanham Act the plaintiff had a "reasonable
interest to be protected against false advertising." Id. (quoting
Thorn, 736 F.2d at 931-32). The Thorn court concluded, Judge Pollak observed, that the plaintiff as an investor had alleged "sufficient
direct injury" to maintain a section 43(a) claim. Id. at 1174-75
(quoting Thorn, 736 F.2d at 931-32). Judge Pollak noted that no
Third Circuit decision since Thorn had enlarged the class of plaintiffs that could bring false advertising claims under section 43(a).
Id. at 1175.
Turning to the case at bar, the judge examined the plaintiffs'
contention that under the "plain meaning" canon of statutory construction utilized in Thorn, the plaintiffs as consumers were intended to be protected by the statutory language of the Lanham
Act that entitled any person who believes that they are likely to be
damaged to sue. Id. at 1175-76. Clarifying the Thorn court's analysis, Judge Pollak explained that beyond the plain meaning interpretation of the statute, the "dispositive question" was whether the
plaintiff had "a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising." Id. at 1176 (quoting Thorn, 736 F.2d at 933). Thejudge
further explained that this "dispositive question" inquiry was excerpted from Rudolph Callmann's treatise on unfair competition,
which stated that the public, namely consumers, did not have a
right of action under section 43(a) because such interests were
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protected by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. (citing Rudolph
Callmann, 1 Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies,
§ 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967)).
In outlining the boundaries of the section 43(a) class of potential plaintiffs, Judge Pollak reiterated that most recent Third Circuit cases stated that the Act is generally intended to protect
commercial interests. Id. at 1177 (citation omitted). Moreover,
the judge pointed out that Thorn demonstrated that the class of
false advertising plaintiffs was not limited to direct competitors of
the wrongdoers. Id. Judge Pollak agreed with Callmann, however,
that consumers' interests were outside the range of "reasonable interests" intended to be protected by section 43(a)'s false advertising prong. Id.
The final issue addressed by Judge Pollak was whether the revised 1988 Lanham Act broadened section 43(a)'s scope to allow
consumer lawsuits for false advertising. Id. The judge pointed out
that the language in the 1988 revision of section 43(a) pertaining
to false advertising was substantially similar to the 1946 version of
the Act as it related to the claims in the instant case. Id. Addressing the plaintiffs' argument that the legislative history of the 1988
revision authorized consumer lawsuits for false advertising, Judge
Pollak noted that the Judiciary Committee deleted a provision in a
bill that would have explicitly included consumers within the purview of section 43(a). Id. at 1178 (citingJ. Thomas McCarthy, 2
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27.0415], at 27-55
(3d ed. 1992)). Furthermore, the court observed that a HouseSenate compromise defeated Congressman Kastenmeier's desire to
include consumers within the class of plaintiffs able to bring suit
under section 43(a). Id. (citation omitted).
Concluding the court's analysis, Judge Pollak expressed confidence that Congress did not intend to commit federal judicial resources to entertaining consumer claims of false advertising. Id. at
1179. The judge reiterated his opinion that section 43(a) had a
much narrower purpose and joined the Second Circuit in holding
that the Lanham Act did not grant consumers a cause of action for
false advertising. Id.
Although recognizing that the Federal Trade Commission and
state courts might not adequately protect consumers from false advertising, Judge Pollak expressed concern that the federal courts
were already overburdened. Id. The judge suggested that before
granting consumers a right of action under section 43 (a), Congress
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should consider withdrawing other tasks, such as diversity cases,
from the federal courts. Id. at 1180.
In Serbin, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized and followed the clear boundaries of section 43 (a)
of the Lanham Act. Judge Pollak acknowledged that neither the
explicit statutory language nor the legislative history of the Lanham Act supported the plaintiffs' claim that Congress intended
consumers to be protected under section 43(a) of the Act.
Mindful of the fact that the statute was enacted to protect
commercial entities from unfair competition, allowing a consumer,
who has no commercial interest or is not a competitor of the
wrongdoer, to bring a claim under section 43(a) would be an unwarranted enlargement of the statutory purpose. Indeed, to allow
such a claim would, in the words of Congressman Fish, have "the
likely effect of turning the Federal courts into a small claims court."
Id. at 1178 (quotation omitted). Consumer claims for false advertising are properly handled by the Federal Trade Commission and
the state courts because the federal courts are already
overburdened with other concerns.
Scott S. Servilla

